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Introduction
We may wonder about the status of logical accounts of the
meaning of language.
When does a particular proposal count as a semantic theory?
How do we judge a theory to be “correct”?
What criteria can we use to decide whether one theory is
“better” than another?
Here we will seek to defend what might be described as a
“descriptivist” approach.
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Traditional formal semantics
A traditional account of what constitutes a semantic theory is
to provide a systematic translation of linguistic constructs into
an appropriate formalism that captures the salient aspects of
behaviour.
In the case of indicative sentences, this could be a translation
of sentences into form in which the truth conditions of the
translated sentences, and the relationships between then,
accords with intuitions about the original sentences.
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Some questions
What are the “salient aspects of behaviour”, and in what sense
should they be “captured”?
What counts as an appropriate formalism, or interpretation?.
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The data
What is the salient behaviour that we are trying to capture,
model or explain: what is the data?
Often the data is messy, with confounding aspects of
behaviour.
If we wish to capture a particular aspect of behaviour, there is
a question as to what are the most natural lines of division.
It can sometimes be unclear how to factorise the behaviour of
a given example into these different aspects.
There may also be questions as to whether it is right to seek
to factorise behaviour in this way, or whether a more holistic
approach is required.
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Simplifying the data
It is often traditional to use toy examples and scenarios.
This might be considered a weakness.
But it could be justified by appeal to natural science: it is
conventional to make simplifying assumptions, and capture the
behaviour of simplified systems.
Again we may question the impact of such simplifications, and
whether the categories of phenomena are in any sense
“natural”, and independent.
(These are perhaps arguments that semanticists need to be
aware of the linguistic data, and perhaps consider
cross-linguistic data as a guard against over-generalising from
one language.)
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The interpretation
In addition to the question of the data, there is also the issue
of what kinds of system are assumed appropriate as vehicles
for expressing semantic behaviour.
What criteria should be used to determine that one target
formalisation (logic or theory) is more appropriate than
another?
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Conventional formal semantics
Implicitly, many accounts of formal semantics attribute a
foundational status to set theory (and set-theoretic
characterisations of possible worlds in particular).
The goal of a semantic theory is then to find a translation of
the phenomena of interest into a such a set-theoretic model
(perhaps by way of a logic that is then interpreted by a
set-theoretic model).
Such theories may be deemed to have “explanatory” or
“predictive” power if a mapping can found into expressions of
set-theory that have the appropriate behaviour by virtue of the
rules of set-theory.
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Example: The Montagovian approach
A classic example of this approach is due to Montague (1973,
1974).
Montague translated a toy fragment of English into a logical
representation (IL).
This representation was then interpreted in set theory.
But Montague viewed the set theory as the “real” semantics:
the translations were set up so that the logical representation
could be eliminated.
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Example: Montague’s Intensionality
Intensionality can be dealt with using possible worlds.
These are given using a set-theoretic characterisation
A possible world is a [consistent] set of propositions [which are
true in that world].
Alternative: a proposition is a set of worlds [in which that
proposition is true].
Propositions that have the same truth value in the current
world can still be distinguished if their truth values vary at
other worlds.
This can be exploited to model the epistemic modalities.
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Example: Plurals
We need a way of formalising talk about pluralities of
individuals.
One approach is to use set theory for plural entities (e.g.
Landman)
“boys” = {a, b, c}
“john and mary” = {j} ∪ {m}
Predication is then of sets of entities.
Singular entities are singleton sets.
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Example: Questions and Answers
Although traditionally used for indicatives, set-theoretic possible
worlds have been proposed for other kinds of utterances and
sentential forms, such as questions and their answers.
Questions represent a partition of worlds
E.g. yes/no questions partition the world into two sets
Each set in the partition corresponds to a different possible
answer
An answer indicates a partition.
A correct answer indicates in which partition the current world
is located.
A Semantic Method
Set theory and possible worlds
Some questions and issues
Why set theory?
As evident in common practice, and its justification, set theory
has a de facto and de jure foundational status.
Why are set-theoretic interpretations given primacy over
logical, or other formal interpretations?
One justification is that existence of a translation of a
particular feature into some set-theoretic construct which
mimics the desired behaviour provide some form of explanation
that goes beyond “mere” description.
Set theory is sometimes seen as playing a foundational role
that sets it apart form other kinds of formalism (and notation).
But set-theoretic interpretations are not without problems . . .
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Specific Issues
Intensionality interpretation as sets gives the wrong results.
Also, possible worlds do not appear as such
(reduced to sets).
Plurals what does {{j}, {m}} mean?
Could be considered for controlling distributive
inferences (Landman).
But shown to be inappropriate (Schwarzschild).
Questions and answers set-theoretic PW model has oddities.
To produce true answers you need to know
which world you are in.
So why would you ask questions?
Issue of computational tractability (Bos &
Gabsdil)
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Arguments from Benacerraf
Number theory can be derived using an appropriate “encoding”
of numbers as sets,
e.g. 1 = {{}}, 2 = {{{}}} . . ..
But there may be different encodings
e.g. 1 = {{}}, 2 = {{{}}, {}} . . ..
These encodings may vary in their behaviour, both from each
other, and from the common understanding of what numbers
are.
e.g. is 2 ∈ 3?
These issues are used to justify the view that numbers do not
refer to some specific concrete realisation, but instead are
structural things in themselves.
That structure may be manifest in many other systems [whose
behaviours go beyond that of numbers].
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Arguments from Dummett
Jumping straight to set-theory leads to metaphysical questions
about meaning and language being overlooked.
It presupposes that the ontology of language is that of sets.
All other metaphysical options and ontological choices are
ignored.
(It seems these particular arguments are independent of
Dummett’s case for constructivism.)
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Application to Semantics
Similar arguments can be applied to set-theoretic semantic
theories.
Formal semantics should focus on determining appropriate
“structural” characterisations of behaviour, independent of a
specific set-theoretic interpretation.
This also allows ontological issues to be treated more seriously.
(Cf. Feferman’s notions of adequacy and faithfulness.)
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Alternative Approaches
The alternative to a set-theoretic approach (of mapping
phenomena more-or-less directly into set-theoretic constructs)
is to
help ourselves to “new” primitives and ontological categories,
and
devise logical rules and axioms that capture the appropriate
inferential behaviour (as in Turner 1992) in terms of those
primitives.
Even if we don’t think meaning (of language) should inform
our metaphysics, we should at least allow ontological
considerations to inform our analysis of meaning.
(A set-theoretic model then can be used to demonstrate a
degree of formal hygiene, rather than being a primary
objective.)
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Examples: Alternatives to Montague
There are a number of theories that consider “independent”
formalisations of behaviour
Property Theory
(e.g. Chierchia and Turner, 1988; Bealer 1982).
Situation Theory
(e.g. Barwise 1987)
By avoiding sets, they avoid the need to work around implicitly
extensional behaviour.
(Proof-theoretic NL semantics may also count as a general
alternative, e.g. Francez & Dyckhoff, 2007.)
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Examples: Plurals
Appropriate structural axioms can be formulated, akin to
lattice theory, or merology (Link, Schwarzschild etc.)
These can be axiomatised independently of any particular
set-theoretic interpretation.
Particular set-theoretic structures may exemplify lattices, but
that does not mean that there is no independent notion of a
lattice.
(An additional, separate, methodological issue arises in that
mathematicians may use the language of set theory to
formulate the notion of a lattice.)
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Examples: Questions and Answers
Alternative theories exist (e.g. Ginzburg & Sag) that do not
rely on an overt reduction to possible worlds.
Analysis with situations or type theory
(e.g. using dependent record types).
Other approaches may be possible (e.g. taking questions to be
a new basic category, as with propositions in Property Theory).
(Questions about reduction to abstraction.)
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Examples: Comment
The argument is not that these accounts provide the best or
the most comprehensive analysis of the phenomena in question.
But their flaws in adequacy are no different in kind from those
set-theoretic accounts that tend to model idealised versions of
the phenomena in question.
Using set theory, or not, does not avoid the hard problems in
semantics.
But using set theory may lead to a failure in faithfulness
(cf. Feferman).
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Criticisms of this alternative approach
This approach might be criticised as mere “descriptivism”:
it just characterises the data in some formalism;
it lacks any predictive or explanatory power.
Some may argue that these faults do not arise in set-theoretic
semantics.
A Semantic Method
Less reductive alternatives
Defence of the alternative
Issues with justification of set theory
Why should set theory be seen to be predictive or explanatory?
Given that ZF set theory is the most powerful theory, what
explanatory power is there in showing that there is a mapping
into it?
There is a constructive element here: a mapping from
language into set theory has to be provided.
But it could be argued that the mapping itself is (merely) a
proxy description.
The relevant intended behaviour is not explicit in the
set-theory by itself.
(And ontological/metaphysical questions do not apppear to be
considered very seriously.)
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Questions of Foundations
Even if we deny set theory a foundational role in semantics,
there are still foundational questions.
We can consider which foundational framework (cf. Feferman
1992) is most appropriate, or required.
For example:
Finitary v. Infinitary
Uncountable v. Countable
Impredicative v. Predicative
Non-constructive v. Constructive
And we can take into account other, metaphysical issues.
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Conclusion
We argue that the role of formal theory is to provide an
adequate and faithful presentation of observed behaviour.
Reductive set-theoretic analyses of semantics are open to a
version of Benacerraf’s and Dummett’s criticisms.
Reductions to set theory perhaps make it too easy to avoid, or
fail to take account of, questions of ontology and formal
power.
Any remaining claims about the inadequacies of “descriptivist”
accounts compared to set-theoretic reductions must rely on
criteria and assumptions that lie outside the domain of formal
semantics as such.
